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GOVERNMENT'S  POWER TO CONTROL  LAND  USE
Historically,  we  have  relied  in  the  United  States on the  three
classic  powers  of a  government  to  control  the  use  of  land:  the
power  to  condemn,  the  power  to  tax,  and  the  power  to  police.
These  are  the  powers  inherent  in  every  organized  state;  indeed,
they  may  be  regarded  as  primary  attributes  of sovereignty.  We
have added  to these  powers as  the  nation  has developed,  in ways
that are more or less unique  in scale of execution if not in concept.
We  have  done this  through:  the  power to  spend  public funds  dis-
criminately  and the  power  to inform.
Over a century  ago,  Alexis de Tocqueville  was impressed  with
the  scale  of the  programs  of public  works  that  he  witnessed  in
his  celebrated  tour  of  America,  and  with  the  vigor  with  which
they  were  pursued.  Spending  power  undoubtedly  has  been  the
dominant  tool  by which  government  has sought to  guide  land use
in the public interest in the United States.  We spend public money
in ways that discriminate among land uses. There has been a toler-
ance of differential  distributions  of benefits  that in an international
perspective  is  amazing.  Many  private  land  users  have  benefited
and  have  largely  retained  their  gains.  Many  less  fortunate  land
users  have  been  hurt  and  have  not  been  compensated.  Only  if
their  land  is  taken  in  a  legal  sense  are  they  entitled  to  damages.
This  legal  and  cultural  convention  has  shaped  land  use  in  the
United  States  more powerfully  than any other rule.  First with ca-
nals  and  wagon  roads,  then  with  the  railroads,  ports,  and  street
railways,  and  finally  through  the manner  in  which  we  have  built
roads,  airports,  drainage  and  irrigation  works and  promoted river
basin  development,  we  have  guided,  if not controlled,  the use of
land.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  this  has  always  been  in the
public  interest.
The  power  to  inform  has  hardly  been  less  important.  Land
records  are  public  records  in the  United  States.  They  are  not  in
many  other  countries.  Transactions  in  land  have  been  openly
reported.  It has  been  culturally  acceptable  to  inquire  about  the
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of disclosure  that  is  regarded  with  awe,  and  suspicion,  in many
other countries.  The  land  was  for  the  most  part  uniformly  sur-
veyed, at early stages of development if not always ahead of settle-
ment.  Conditions  were  created,  in  short,  that  promoted  market
processes  in allocating land among alternative uses. This freedom
was abused,  and  still is,  but it  is testimony to the fact that perfec-
tion of the market has been a major goal of public policy to promote
land use in  the  public interest.
The power to police  has evolved  in the past half century from
simple beginnings  in the law of nuisances  into a complex  structure
of powers  to zone.  To many people,  land use control  means zon-
ing.  It  is  clearly  the  most  ubiquitous  example  of public  policy
toward land use at the local level of government.  Fred  Bosselman
and David Callies,  in The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control,
their recent assessment of land use controls  in the United  States,
begin with the history  of zoning.
It  is  a  misreading  of our  history  to  identify  the  birth  of land
use controls  in the United States with the birth of zoning.  A major
part of the  history  of our land  policy  is  a  history of the  exercise
of land  use  control  through  public  ownership.  Preceding  efforts
to  regulate  land  use through  the police  power,  there  were  signifi-
cant  developments  of control  through  outright  public  ownership,
most  prominently  of the  National  Parks  and  National  Forests.
The National Parks in particular were unique institutions.  Nothing
quite  like  them  existed  before.  They  have  been  widely  studied
and used  as  models  by other countries.
The  acquisition of land for public works  projects has  also had
a  history  in  the  United  States  that  is  unique  among  developed
countries committed to a system of private property rights  in land.
Beginning  with canals,  and  railroads,  and  perfected  in the  era of
the  motor  car  and  large-scale  river  basin  planning,  we  possess
one  of the  world's  most  developed  and  efficient  bodies  of  law
authorizing  the  taking  of private  land for  public  purposes.  Espe-
cially  with  regard  to  areas  of "critical  environmental  concern,"
we  have had our most extensive  experience  with land use controls
in the form of outright  public ownership or acquisition.
It  remains  true,  however,  that  the  methods  of overt  land  use
control used  to  date  in  the  United  States  depend  primarily  upon
some variation of zoning.  The use of this tool in the United States
is  more  extensive  than  in  any  other country.  This  resulted  from
our federal  structure, the historic detachment of local governments
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that seemed  to  present a  minimum challenge  to established  prop-
erty rights.
This  history  contrasts  sharply  with  the  preference  for  more
direct forms of land use controls in developed countries of Western
Europe,  from which we derive  our cultural  and our legal heritage.
TRANSPORTATION,  LAND USE  CONTROLS,  AND  AGRICULTURAL  LAND
Our modern  development  of land use control methods  mirrors
our history  of transport development.  The most  portentous result
has been the American  suburb with single-family  detached  houses
on generous sized  lots.
The  resulting  suburban  sprawl  presents  a  variation  on  Say's
law,  that  supply  creates  its  own  demand.  This  is  illustrated  by
policies  or  programs  to  increase  the  available  supply  of building
land in the suburbs by  improved road systems. The increased sup-
ply not only has created its own demand but has increased demand
above previous levels.  It has been fashionable  to  "live in the sub-
urbs"  and  commute  to  work.  The  greater  the  number  who  did
it, the greater  the number who wanted to do it. To deal with urban
problems  we  must deal  with questions  of fashions  in living-with
"life  styles."
This is the central problem faced  by those who complain about
our  failure  to  develop  mass  transit.  The  automobile  introduced
a new  life  style,  a new  fashion,  in  living.  In  this  case,  the  mode
of transport was  the independent  variable.
But  it  is  not  clear  that  this  process  applies  to  other  modes
of transport.  If busses or mass rail transport are to be the indepen-
dent variables  which  will change fashions  in  living,  it is  clear that
people  will have  to be forced  to  ride them by  strict land use  con-
trols. This  is what the Swedes have  done. This  is what the  British
have  tried  to  do.  Can  we  do  it  in  the  United  States?  It  will  be
much  more  difficult than  in Sweden  or Great  Britain.
Acceptance  of strict  land use  controls  in  Sweden  was  helped
tremendously  by  its  role  as  a  neutral  in  two  World  Wars.  The
possibility of maintaining this role was highly dependent on mainte-
nance  of a  domestic food  supply base.  Prevention  of the  conver-
sion  of good  farm  land  into  urban  types  of land  use  was  given
tremendous  moral  and  ultimately  political  support  by  the  desire
to  preserve  Swedish  neutrality.  Although  Great  Britain  was  not
a neutral  in  the  two  World  Wars,  it  was  acutely  conscious  of the
fact that it could  not feed  itself from  its own land  resources.
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and  farm  demands  for  land  takes  place  in  their  more  productive
agricultural  areas-the  south  and  east  of England  (Manchester-
Birmingham-London)  and  the  south  and  west  of  Sweden
(Stockholm-Malmo-G6teborg).
Many  of  the  most  acute  urban  pressures  upon  land  in  the
United  States  occur  in  areas  where  land  is  relatively  unproduc-
tive!  Such areas  are:  Boston-Pittsburgh-Washington;  Milwaukee-
Chicago-Cleveland-Detroit;  Houston; Dallas-Ft.  Worth; the Twin
Cities;  Phoenix-Tempe;  San Diego.
The San  Francisco  Bay area  is an exception,  as are  a  number
of other California areas,  Hawaii, and some Middle Western cities:
Omaha,  Indianapolis,  Des  Moines,  Peoria-Decatur-Bloomington,
and others.
But  in  general  the  areas  of greatest  agricultural  productivity
in  the  United  States  are  not  subjected  to  severe  encroachment
from  urban  demands  for  land.  The  Corn  Belt,  the  Mississippi
Delta,  the  Dairy  Belt,  and  many  irrigated  valleys  of  the  West
escape the worst of the urban  thrust.
This leads to a key question:  Is it possible  to enforce  stiff con-
trols on the  conversion of agricultural land in a country  producing
an  agricultural  surplus?  The  countries  that have  the  tightest  con-
trols on land use today are countries  that have  either faced  recent
threats  to  their  food  supply  in  wartime,  or  are  dependent  on
imports  for  a  substantial  fraction  of their  food,  or  both.  These
forces are  absent in  the United  States.
CITIES,  SUBURBS,  AND  LAND USE POLICY
Underlying  the changes  that  have  come  with  suburbanization
are fundamental  shifts in  the economic  and  social  structure.  Two
images of society are in conflict.  In the traditional view,  the socio-
economic  structure  is  visualized  as  a  pyramid,  with  the  bulk  of
the population  in  low-income  classes  at the  bottom.  In  contrast,
a more realistic view is to recognize that the socio-economic  struc-
ture is beginning to resemble  a cube,  standing on one of its points.
The  masses are  in the middle.  This  is a  dominant fact of contem-
porary economic  and political  life.
As  a  consequence,  the tax-paying  population  includes  a large
number  of "new"  taxpayers  who  come  from  families  that  have
never  in  their family  histories  paid  significant  amounts  of income
tax  or  property  tax.  Higher  income  levels  and  the  expansion  of
private  home  ownership  are  introducing  these  families  to  a class
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traditions  have  not prepared  them.
The  result has  been to  set in  motion a socio-economic  sorting-
out  process.  Low  and  lower  middle  class  income  groups  have  a
high  resistance  to  tax  paying.  They  are  apt  to  vote  down  bond
issues  for more  or  better  schools.  Those  who  want  better  public
services,  and  above  all  better  schools,  move  out  of the  central
cities.  An  income  stratification  of suburbs  tends  to  result,  with
higher-income  taxpayers  clustering  in  areas  where  they  can  get
the  quality  of services they  demand.
This  migration  of those  who  understand  what  taxes  are  for,
and are willing to  pay them if the  services  are good,  impoverishes
the  central  city  by:  (1)  reducing  income  levels,  property  values,
and  tax-paying  capacity;  and  (2)  robbing  the  core  city  of civic
leaders,  and of men and  women  who feel  responsible  for "their"
city.
A  more  serious  consequence  of socio-economic  stratification
is  the  loss  of heterogeneity  in  our  schools.  James  Tobin,  in  the
Journal  of Law and Economics, October  1970,  says:
A major problem in American education today is that public  schools,
reflecting  and  in  turn  influencing  residential  patterns,  are  becoming
increasingly  homogeneous..  . The relationships  here are complex  and
uncertain,  and  excessive  heterogeneity  in  schools  and  classrooms  may
be as  unproductive  as  excessive  homogeneity.  But the  evidence  seems
to be that some racial,  social and intellectual  heterogeneity  is productive.
In characteristic  fashion  we turn  to the motor vehicle  for solu-
tion.  The resulting  bussing controversies  have given  rise to  some
of the  ugliest  incidents  of our  time,  but  the  underlying  cause  is
seldom  traced  to  the  defects  in  land  policy  that  have  generated
major  parts of the  problem.
LAND  MARKETS  AND  LAND  USERS
Just how effective  will the environmental threat be in reforming
our  attitudes  toward  the  goals  and  methods  of land  use control?
Bosselman  and  Callies  argue  in  The  Quiet Revolution  in  Land
Use Control that a  major reason  for this revolution  is  the change
that has taken place  in our concept of land.  In the  past we viewed
land as  a commodity,  and  zoning  was a  control device  consistent
with  this  view.  The  key  supporting  argument  was  that  the  land
user  should  be  prevented  from  engaging  in  uses  that  depreciated
the  value  of his  neighbor's  land.  More  recently,  they  argue,  we
have begun to treat land not only as a commodity but as a resource.
In their view,  land as  a resource  introduces considerations of con-
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valued  when  land is treated  as a commodity.
This  distinction  between  land  as  a  commodity  and  land  as  a
resource  is  not very helpful.  A resource  is conventionally  defined
as an input  into a production  process.  This leaves  unresolved  the
questions  of what  is  produced  and  in  what  types of markets  the
product is exchanged.
A  major  cause  of the  change  in  our attitudes  toward  land  is
found in the changing  nature of the markets in  which  it  is traded.
The automobile and the airplane have greatly expanded the market
for land as  a consumer good.  Our past attitudes toward  land have
reflected primarily  our view  of it  as a producer's  good.  Land  was
needed for a food  supply,  or for a timber  supply,  or for minerals.
Our laws  regulating  land  ownership,  use,  and  exchange  embody
this concept.
The dramatic change that has occurred in our time is the enor-
mous  expansion  of the market areas  in which  land  is  desired  for
housing,  for recreation,  for  scenic  beauty,  for  isolation,  and  for
related  purposes  that  fall  within  the  economy  of the  household
rather  than  the  economy  of the  firm.  It  is  the  demand  for  land
as  a  consumer's  good  that  has  generated  the  revolution  in  land
use control.
We  are only just beginning to  understand the operation  of this
expanded land  market.  It is badly  structured,  the services of land
that are demanded  are not standardized,  and we lack good classifi-
cations  and  descriptions  of the  differential  capacity  of lands  to
provide these services.  The market,  in short, is lacking in essential
elements  for efficient  operation.
One  measure  of the  change  that  is  occurring  in  response  to
this  new  dimension  of demand  for  land  is  provided  by  the many
ways  in which  the services  of land  are  being redefined,  disaggre-
gated,  and separately  traded.  In the United States,  the first major
step  in  this  direction  involved  the  separation  of mineral  rights,
and in the Western states, of water rights. These are  long standing
practices,  and the  markets  in which  they  are exchanged  are  rea-
sonably  well  organized.  The  new  dimensions  have  come  in  the
separate  identification of air rights,  of scenic  values,  of watershed
protection needs, of wildlife habitats,  and of environmental protec-
tion measures  embodied  in air and water  pollution controls.
The  legal  framework  for  the  separate  identification  of these
rights  in land  has  been  constructed.  Markets  exist  in  which  the
first  halting  and  cumbersome  exchanges  are  taking  place.  One
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served  by  market  processes  is  the  demand  for  residential  and
recreational  sites. That market has suddenly  become  national and
even  international,  while  the totality of our body of laws and  reg-
ulations  that  govern  its  operation  are  state  and  local  in  nature.
And  the automobile  and airplane  inject  the  demand  for home and
recreational  sites  into  competition  with  agricultural,  forest,  and
grazing  land  uses  for  which  our  institutional  structure  not  only
provides  no  protection but intensifies  the conflict.
The focus  of this conflict  is most sharply  visible in our policies
of property  taxation.  It is rapidly becoming impossible  to tax land
fairly on the basis of market values  in a pluralistic  market in which
agricultural  lands  acquire  market  values  that  have  no  relation  to
the relative or absolute  levels of productivity of the land in agricul-
tural use.
Paralleling  this  change  in  the  nature  of the  market  for  land
services,  our  concept  of  the  nature  of the  firm  that  is  involved
in  land use decisions  has also  undergone  a major change.  At one
extreme  is the common property firm, or public agency.  This  may
involve outright ownership,  or control so extensive that it amounts
to ownership.  This  is now a major control device,  and use of this
level  of control will  almost  surely increase.
The  more  interesting  area  of control  is  the  intermediate  area
occupied  by  mixed firms  that involve both  private  profit-oriented
firms and  public  agencies  or  administrative  firms.  The  expansion
in  the  uses  of  easements,  partial  takings,  access  limitations,
licenses  for  specific  uses,  controls  exercised  through  municipal
water supply  and sewage disposal  firms,  airport and port commis-
sions  and quasi-public  development  corporations  all  provide  evi-
dence  of the  pervasive  nature  of  this  form  of land  use  control.
Underlying  this  trend  is  a  fundamental  transformation  in
ideology. This must surely  be recorded as the dominant dimension
of our  changing  attitude  toward  the  goals  and  methods  of land
use control.
The identification of good and evil with private and public own-
ership  and  control  of  land,  in  its  broadest  sense,  is  a  measure
of the  degree  to  which  much  of our  thought  has  been  dominated
by  naive  ideologies.  These  absolutistic  versions  of ideology  are
crumbling.  We  can  see  this  most  clearly  when  we  invert  the
ideology and view other countries.  Milovan  Djilas, the perceptive
Yugoslav critic  of ideology,  can  see the equation of evil  and good
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Europe,  though not yet  in the Soviet  Union.
What  is  more  difficult  for us  to  recognize  is  that  this  decline
in  the  paralyzing  power of ideology  is also  evident  in  the  United
States. This  is  the most  significant  dimension of the quiet revolu-
tion  in  land  use control,  and  the one  we find  most difficult  to  ac-
knowledge.
The  changing  nature  of the  markets  in  which  the  services  of
land  are  traded  raises  basic  questions  about  the  extent  to  which
market  processes  can  be  relied  upon  to  achieve  land  uses  in  the
public  interest.  It is  less  significant  to  observe that we  are  begin-
ning  to  look  upon  land  as  a  resource,  however  defined,  than  it
is to recognize  that we are  increasingly  regarding  access to certain
types  of land  services  as  rights  that are  not  properly  distributed
by  sale  to  the  highest  bidder.  Rights  to  pure  air,  pure  water and
the  protection  of  watersheds,  access  to  scenic  beauty,  oppor-
tunities  for recreation,  and  a  share  in  the  national  endowment  of
open  space  are  not mentioned  in the  United  States  Constitution.
Our  courts,  our  legislatures,  and  responsive  governments  where
they  exist  are  busily  reinterpreting  the  Bill  of Rights  to  include
these entitlements.
The resulting  expansion  in modes  and degree  of land use  con-
trol raises  fundamental  questions  that  go  straight to  the  constitu-
tional  prohibition  against  the  taking  of private  property  without
compensation.  What  is  a  "taking"?  This  is  the  question  raised
in The  Taking Issue,  the  sequel to The  Quiet Revolution in Land
Use  Control, just  published  by  the  Council  on  Environmental
Quality.
The  first  major  reformulation  of the  answer  to  this  question
after the second World War was a result of the Interstate  Highway
program.  Access was controlled, that is, taken,  and in many cases
no compensation  was paid.  Land uses adjacent  to Interstate High-
ways  but  not touched  by  them  were  impaired  and  again,  in  the
majority  of cases,  no compensation  was  paid.  The  basis  for this
expansion of the  permitted scope of public interference  in  private
land  use  was  laid  in  the  1950's.  In  this  sense  it  can  be  argued
that  the  flowering  of the  automobile  era  laid  the  foundation  for
a further expansion  of public  control over  private  land  when the
full  impact  of the  environmental  crisis  struck  later  in  the  1960's.
The  precedent  for expanded  public  interference  in  a  land  user's
freedom  of use  was  laid  by  the  motor  car,  the  same  instrument
that has contributed  so heavily  to the  expanded  demand  for land
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inforced the  pressures  for more land use controls.
Valuation  problems  are  central  to  the  taking  issue,  and  our
tradition is to resolve these by turning to market prices.  This added
demand  upon  the  land  market  process  comes  at  a  time  when  the
ability of the  market to yield clear-cut  answers has  been impaired.
CONCENTRATION  OF LAND  OWNERSHIP
The  concept  of  market  price  loses  precision  when  ability  to
enter  the  market  is  reduced.  Until  about  1960  it  was  reasonable
to  base  land  policy  on  the  assumption  that  land  ownership  was
becoming more  diffused in the United States.  The Taylor Grazing
Act had effectively  closed  major portions  of the  frontier in  1934,
but there was still homesteading  after the  second World War. The
headlong suburban  expansion  of the  1950's and  1960's  made  land-
owners  of families  who in earlier eras of urban growth would have
been renters.  But there is evidence  that this diffusion of land own-
ership  is coming  to  a halt.
Between  1950  and  1973  the  number of farms  was  cut  in  half,
while  the  acreage  of land  in  farms  remained  virtually  unchanged.
We  cannot  speak  with  precision,  since  no  nationwide  study  has
been made  since  1946.  But  it is  unmistakably  clear that there  has
been a  major concentration  in farm  land ownership.
The  1960's  witnessed  the  appearance  of a  new  phenomenon
in  the  American  urban  pattern:  multiple-story  and high-rise  hous-
ing  in  the  suburbs.  Much  of the  recent  suburban  expansion  has
not  been  in  owner-occupied  single-family  detached  housing.  The
rate  at  which  new  landowners  are  being  created  in  the  suburbs
is  slowing down.
Our property  and income tax structures bear a heavy responsi-
bility  for  these  rural  and  urban  trends.  By  taxing  earned  income
at a  progressive  rate  and capital  gains  at a flat  rate,  we guarantee
that  wealthy  buyers  can  bid  the  highest  prices  for  lands  that are
expected  to  enjoy capital  gains.  By  depreciation  rules,  loss  carry
forward  and  carry  back  provisions,  and  permissive  accounting
procedures  we  insure  that  large  firms  are  given  the greatest  tax-
based incentives  to enter the farm  land or housing markets.  Infla-
tion  has  augmented  these  trends.  High  interest  rates  drive  indi-
viduals  and  small  firms  out  of the  market,  since  our  package  of
tax-based  incentives  is  not  available  to  those  with  low  incomes
or limited  capacity  to  use  financial  leverage.
The  land  market  is  increasingly  concentrated  in  fewer  hands,
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ing  complexity  of our corporate  business  world  makes  it difficult
to identify  the  true landowners.  The entry of conglomerate corpo-
rations  into  the  housing and farm  land markets  sharply  decreases
publicly  available  financial  and  accounting  information.  In  some
states,  for  example,  Arizona,  the  practice  of  accepting  deeds
recorded in the names of nominees or trustees  makes it impossible
to  determine  land ownership  from public  records.  It  is  becoming
increasingly  difficult to answer the question:  Who owns this land?
The flow of information  in the land market  is drying  up,  at a time
when  we  need it most.
The  concept  of a market  price  also loses  economic  relevance
when  market  price  signals  become  echoes  of public  policies.  To
the  extent  that  tax  and  financial  advantages  are  bid  into  higher
prices for land and compensation for land taken for public purposes
is  based on  these prices,  public  funds  are  used  to  pay for values
created  by  public policy.
If we  are  to  use  market  processes  in  allocating  land,  a major
effort  is  needed  to  improve  the  market.  Some  of  the  key  steps
that must be taken are concentrated at the national level of govern-
ment,  in income tax policy,  accounting rules, and corporate finan-
cial disclosure  requirements.  It is for this reason that  any attempt
to promote land use in the public interest through market processes
must include  a far larger role for the federal government than  has
been  thought  necessary  in  the  past.  No  ideological  judgment  is
involved  in  this  conclusion.  It  is  the  inevitable  consequence  of
the changing nature  of the land market.
This  must  not  be  interpreted  as  blind  support  for  more  land
use  controls.  Costs  are  always  present  in  any  use  of  power  to
control. The  popular recognition  of the  high cost of land  use  con-
trols is focused on bureaucratic  salaries, the size of planning staffs,
and the "cost  to the taxpayer."  These may be the least significant
cost elements.
The  added  time  cost  involved  in  land  development  decisions
is  often  the  most important  direct  cost of increased  control.  The
burden  of time  costs  increases  dramatically  when  interest  rates
and  tax rates  are  high.  These  rates are  now  at the highest  levels
we  have  known  in this  century.  As  a  consequence  the  costs  of
controls  are  among  the  most  rapidly  increasing  elements  in  land
development  costs.  These  are  passed  on  to  the  consumer  in  a
market  economy.  They play  a major role  in  the current  high cost
of housing,  and  seem likely to  play  an even  greater  role  in future
costs of fuel and energy.
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long  run  may  prove  to  be the  most  significant.  The  cost of  plan
preparation,  waiting for plan approval, or compliance  with changes
required  by  planning  bodies  are all  a  part of overhead  costs.  And
they  are  front-loaded  costs,  which  have  an  impact  on  cash  flow
that is  often out of all proportion  to their significance  in total proj-
ect costs.
As a consequence,  they are highly regressive  over the spectrum
of  firm  sizes.  The  smaller  firm  may  be  required  to  incur  plan-
imposed  costs  that  are  almost  as  high  as  would  be  required  for
a project many times as large.  Per unit costs are disproportionately
increased  to  the  small  firm,  and  there  are  few  opportunities  to
offset  these  costs  with  less  formal  and  time-consuming  planning
procedures.
Land  use  controls  are  thus  a  form  of discriminatory  tax  on
small  firms.  They  may  well  become  the  dominant  force  in  deter-
mining  the  optimum  size  of  firm  in  our  economy.  By  adopting
a complex of land use controls  we may unintentionally  be insuring
that only  large firms  can survive.  This raises the  prospect  of food,
fuel,  and  housing markets  dominated  by  large  firms,  whose  crea-
tion  and  survival  has  been  dictated  by  a  public  policy  aimed  at
other goals.
RESOURCES  AND  MAN
The  automobile,  the  airplane,  and  the  moon-rockets  have
taught  us that  we  cannot  define  space  without  a  concept  of time.
In  the  same  vein,  we  cannot  define  land  independently  of man.
There  is  no  resource  until  one is  recognized  by  man.  Its quantity
cannot  be  measured,  except  in  terms  of the  use  to  which  it  is
put. These uses,  in turn,  are  a function of rates of recovery, costs
of transport,  efficiency  in conversion,  and consumer tastes. These
change,  and  the  available  stock  of resources  changes  with  them.
A stock of resources  is thus not a physical quantity. The  stock
is  created  by  man,  in  that  it cannot  be  said  to  exist  in  economic
terms  until  he  can  use  it.  A  resource,  in  this  view,  is  a  cultural
achievement,  a unit of thought.
An  example  will  illustrate  this  point.  There  are  minerals  in
the  ground  that  we  do  not  know  are  there.  The  fact  that  we  do
not  know  they  are  there,  or that  we  see  them  and  do  not  know
what  to  do  with  them,  leads  us  to  exclude  them from  our  stock
of resources.
Because  we  do  not know  they  are  there,  or do  not know  what
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resources,  except in terms of man's intelligence  and skill in putting
them  to use.  This  intelligence  and these  skills  are  not  finite.  And
therefore  our  stock of resources  is not  finite.
It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  concept  of "spaceship  earth"  has
had  a  perverse  influence.  It  has  hardened  the  idea  that  we  live
on  a  finite  planet,  therefore  we  are  in  danger  of  exhausting  its
resources.
If land  use controls  are  to  be  effective,  they must  prevent  the
consumption  of some  resource.  If there  are  to  be  resources  for
our  grandchildren,  we  must  cut  back  on  our  rate  of use  in  this
generation.  As  a  policy  for  survival,  we  must  stop  growth,  and
strive  for a  stable  state.  We  are  victims  of a  modern  version  of
the "end of the frontier"  psychosis.
These prescriptions  betray  a fundamental failure to understand
the  nature  of resources.  In an  economic  sense,  they  are  created
by  man.  They  can  be altered  by  man.  And  because  our capacity
for  intellectual  and  spiritual  growth  is  not  limited,  our  stock  of
resources  is not  limited,  in the conventional  sense.
But there is a sense  in which our stock  of resources  is  limited.
We  can  put  a  stop  to  intellectual  growth.  We  can  reach  levels
of overpopulation  that  destroy  social  and  political  organization.
We  can  have  levels  of pollution,  congestion,  and  overcrowding
that cause us  to "bite  each other's tails,"  as  pigs  do in  close con-
finement.
In these  ways we  can  limit  or destroy our  stock of resources.
The  surest  way  to  do  this  is  to  destroy  intellectual  freedom  in
our universities  and  schools.  This is  where resources  are created.
And  this  is  why  the  ultimate  measure  of our  stock  of resources
is to  be found  in  our cultural  commitment,  in our  social stability,
and in our  ability to  live at peace with our fellow  men.
This  is the  recognition  that  can  define  a sound  choice of rules
for land use control.  We  need  multiple methods  because  we  have
multiple goals.  For many of our land use problems,  public owner-
ship is the preferred  solution.  For others,  we  can rely on the flexi-
bility that is offered by  innovations in  zoning and use of the police
power.  The  public-law  corporation  is  a  useful  alternative,  par-
ticularly  in  land use  problems associated  with transport  and river
basin development.  The  improvement  of market  processes  holds
great  potential,  and a reform  in tax policies can contribute greatly
to this end.
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encourage  full  use and future  development.  It will  be a disservice
to  the  cause  of  land  use  planning  if  it  is  identified  with  an  anti-
technology  bias and a no-growth policy.  We can ride the environ-
mental  protection  tiger,  but  is  will  take  a  great deal  of skill,  and
no  dogmatism.
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